By: Haajar Abu IsmailLike so many countries in this world, the circumstances of Korea’s split begins with the issue of foreign intervention. Historically, Korea had been a united state throughout the Choson Dynasty up until 1910, when the Japanese colonialism of Korea had become more official. With Korea recognized as a Japanese colony, there came the question of splitting up the territory that came with their loss of WWII. As a result of an agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Korea was then divided into North and South, respectively, along the 38th parallel in August, 1945. That division is what most recognize as the norm today. The separated nations were effectively recognized as tools for spreading each occupying state’s reigning ideology, with Russia promoting Communism, and the USA promoting Democracy. Their influence played a vital role in shaping the political and social nature of North and South Korea today. Prior to the joint-occupation, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) had branches controlling local governments, and the people’s committees were recognized by the Soviet Union in the North, but not by the USA in the South. In the North, land was re-distributed to Korean landlords and tenants, and large industries became nationalized. In the South, land was re-distributed as well, and the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was established and staffed by Korean and Japanese officials. Both the USA and the Soviet Union worked to restructure the Koreas in their preferred ideological image. Eventually, in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in North Korea was established with the support of the Soviet Union, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South was established with the support of the USA in the same year. What played out from then on was a proxy war between the two larger states, for which Korea paid the price. The Korean War lasted from 1950 to 1953, with an estimated death toll of at least 2.5 million people. It began with the invasion of the South by the North, and ended when an armistice was signed. This invasion was also the first military action of the Cold War, and is also referred to as the ‘Forgotten War,’ for the lack of attention the conflict received in comparison to the Vietnam War as well as the past World Wars. Importantly, the war ending in a stalemate has since then cemented each state’s ideological divisions as separate Communist and Democratic nations, despite both having been ruled by dictators. Those leaders were Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee, respectively. Since then, the line between Koreas originally drawn by foreign states became crucially recognized by the former after each side’s ultimately failed attempt to gain ground during the war. Re-unification was then no longer an issue of waiting for foreign powers to leave, because when opportunity allowed that was precisely what was attempted through the invasion that started the war. However, it was no longer a union of ‘Korea’ as it had been historically, but a question of ideological conflict for two sides that had even then been shaped by completely different viewpoints due the Soviet and American influence. The years that have passed since then have seen the Koreas grow increasingly further apart in values, and establish extremely different societies from their shared history. In short, Korea split because as a Japanese colony, they were viewed as fair game for spreading the US and Soviet Union’s varied ideologies. The spread of those beliefs was then the core catalyst for why the division between North and South has continued to persist despite the receding influence of the foreign intervention that started it.
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Overview of Webinar, Beyond Politics: Contemporary North Korean Culture and Common Misconception2/28/2021 By: Haajar Abu Ismail Image: a screenshot of the webinar event with the guest lecturers, Dr. Immanuel Kim and Megane Visette The words ’North Korea’ doubtlessly bring to mind a string of negative connotations. Some are wildly imaginative while others are grounded in truth, but what they both overshadow is the existence of a unique, North Korean culture. Too often, Kim Jong Un is perceived as the main representation of what North Korea is, if not the only one that exists. HanVoice McGill hosted a Webinar to tackle exactly these issues, featuring guest speakers Dr. Immanuel Kim and Ms. Megan Visette. Dr. Kim is a specialist in North Korean literature and cinema and Professor at George Washington University, and Ms. Visette is a Government Relations Specialist and Director of Knowledge Management at HanVoice Support Association. What follows is a comprehensive overview of their valuable insight on North Korean film and stereotypes respectively, and hence, culture as well.
Indeed, what better lens into a nation’s culture than its film productions? Dr. Kim shed light on the mystery of North Korean cinema, which is introduced with a specific set of North Korean works, “5 Guerrilla Brothers," "Sea of Blood" and especially, “Flower Girl.” Centered on topics ranging from war to drama, they are by no means a light watch. Though, while these are cinematic masterpieces in their own right, popular North Korean cinema most often takes form in Comedy. Or more specifically, the Romantic Comedy. Yes, that does mean North Koreans love Rom-Coms just as much as the rest of us, and they’re a lot more similar than you might think. The films in this genre feature satire towards the West as well North Korean themselves, the ‘mistaken identity trope’ when you assume someone’s identity is other than who they actually are, and not to mention a healthy dose of 'family problems.’ Some recommendations include, “Jolly Stage,” "Oh Youth," and “Comrade Kim Goes Flying." Yes, you may find some of the general rom coms are ‘educational’ in nature, and Dr. Kim brings up a valuable point concerning criticism of these works. Often, critics approach these films with analysis that highlights their "political, ideological, and didactic” manner which thus make them “boring to watch.” Well, why can’t they just simply be enjoyed? No one will deny the obvious presence of propaganda in these works. Instead, ‘change the mindset’ you approach the films with and discover the ‘interesting culture behind the propaganda façade.’ An interesting culture, which is extremely misunderstood by the public, as Ms. Visette conveys in her presentation. Evidently, there is no shortage of stereotypes on North Korea, but she highlights the most prevalent. First and foremost, it must be dispelled that ‘North Korean people are brainwashed.’ Visette discusses how there seems to be a reigning preconception of North Koreans as zealous Kim Jong Un worshippers, not even aware of how their minds have been twisted. It would be a lie to say that North Korean propaganda and culture has not conditioned its citizens, but it would be doubly wrong to assume an extreme of their implied inability to think for themselves. Visette even mentions that oftentimes refugees did not live in North Korea believing their society was ‘wrong' or ‘oppressive,' because their lives were normal by their standards. This isn’t a rule, of course, but the point stands that normal is contextual for everyone. While it’s true that North Koreans are much more aware of the world than the average person would give them credit for, it’s worth noting the extensive barriers in place to prevent this from happening. To quote Visette, ‘what North Korea fears the most is ideological warfare.’ She brings up the absolute state control of media and entertainment, from journalism to the illegality of foreign products. There is also a heavy surveillance system in place both in terms of physical and social mobility. For the former, permission is required for domestic travel, and for the latter, the North Korean songbun class system organizes citizens into varied social classes, with a hierarchy based upon their perceived loyalty to the reigning Communist party. Though, Visette states that 'experts say this system is weakening.’ This is one among many divisions between citizens in North Korea. This may seem obvious, but not all North Koreans, or all of North Korea is the same. However, it must be mentioned that there’s an especially high law enforcement and punishment system present in North Korea that prevents access to foreign information, the threat of which may keep many from actively pursuing this illegal information. It also sheds light on the stereotypical question concerning why North Koreans don’t protest. Given this, the stereotype of North Korean ignorance on the outside world also makes more sense even though it’s far from true. There’s the jangmadang, the black market presence in North Korea that has appeared as a way of purchasing basic commodities. To elaborate, Visette claims how despite what most would think, North Koreans can and do own cell phones, there is just typically no access to outside media on it. Though, it was mentioned that illegal Chinese messaging apps could be installed through a heavy middleman process to allow people to keep in touch. Importantly, dispelling these stereotypes is not an attempt to undermine the oppression suffered by its people, only to help understand an often demonized state in the media in a less biased manner. And who better to learn from than North Koreans themselves? Defectors who have spoken up and written about their experiences would be a good place to start. For the curious and willing, Visette recommends reading "The Aquariums of Pyongyang," "Stars Between the Sun and Moon," "Under the Same Sky" and "Witness to Transformation." Hopefully, an authentic perspective would raise worthwhile awareness on the ignored cultural depth that North Korea has to offer, and its right to be appreciated. By Neo Paul Retrieved from Le Point, from © KCNA VIA KNS/AFP / STR DPRK’s 3 secrets to stop the Covid-19: definitely not clickbait. (May or may not resemble a high school marketing presentation on Powerpoint completed the night of the deadline) “The whole world is watching in amazement and disbelief.” So says Un A, a young, unassuming and sharply dressed korean woman that looks like any other korean woman of her age. Except Un A proudly sports a small lapel pin (1) or ‘loyalty badge’ emblazoned with the image of the late but Eternal President, aka Kim Il Sung. Un A is the new face of the North Korean Propaganda Bureau, reflecting a trend towards the proverbial ‘Hip’. Gone are the days of choreographed goose stepping soldiers, roaring masses who sing praises to the Kim Dynasty and scream for the destruction of America. Well, gone for international audiences that is. Recently, DPRK apparatchiks have opted for a more, well, ‘normal’ approach. YouTube. Yes, that’s right North f*cking Korea has a YouTube Channel for propounding propaganda. Their aim is simple: To portray North Korea and its people as just like you and I. Started in 2017, the channel boasts a not unsizeable (for an authoritarian agitprop organ) 30k subs- all foreigners presumably (North Korea has an intranet, viz. An internal internet) and their videos are mostly in english, with a few korean ones but with subtitles available in German, French, Russian and Chinese in addition to English. Some videos have garnered over 100,000 views, with one exceeding 640,000! (2) I, being a McGill student and thus possessing a lot of time to procrastinate, perused some of the videos. The two on COVID-19 and the DPRK were the focus, and shed some light into their imaginary portrayal of it. One of them was just comical: A short video in the T/F format: “True or False(Panic Buying): Un A’s Pyongyang tour series: #northkorea” Wherein she pretended to film a store (the only store she features in her videos) undercover and in her bag and ask clients and employees on whether or not North Koreans were panic buying as here in the Imperialist pig-headed west. Of course not a single one admitted there was, but one did interestingly state that “except for imported goods(whose price had gone up), but who needs them?” evincing the fact that, due to COVID-19 and the cordon sanitaire around the DPRK imported goods have shot through the price glass ceiling, but that your ‘average’ North Korean thought it was their patriotic duty to ‘buy local’ and help facilitate the goal of autarchy as enshrined in the national ideology Juche. The other videos attempt to explain that North Korea is barely affected by the Coronavirus. “If there were not people wearing masks, there’s no sign of any unusual situation.” Allegedly, according to Un A 씨 toilet paper is among the top three most popular products. This can mean one of two things: either that North Koreans are not impervious to panic buying toilet paper like we capitalists, or that this new bourgeois invention is a necessity and beats ‘the revolutionary rags'(3). “As you can see all the shops are fully stocked with products and food to satisfy (sic) people’s demand.” So this is an attempt to parry the facts away: According to a US intelligence report, 60% of North Koreans are expected to go hungry by the end of 2020 (4). Shopping with Un A in Pyongyang is not an option for the majority of the DPRK’s denizens. Hunger should never be something anyone should have to think about. But, according to the USFK Commander Abrams, North Korea has imposed a new ‘Shoot to Kill’ order following the imposition of a 2 mile wide ‘buffer zone’ from the Chinese Border. Now this literally shoots two birds with one stone: Not only does this ostensibly allow the North Korean SOF to shoot people crossing over from China and potential vectors of the Coronavirus, but also smugglers and human traffickers who seek to enrich themselves by selling western goods or women into sexual slavery. Now, shooting anyone who crosses the border may seem intense, but it fits in perfectly with the regime’s track record. Especially since North Korea exhibits one of the most backwards and decrepit medical systems in the world. A COVID outbreak would not only result in thousands if not hundreds of thousands of deaths but could potentially cripple the regime’s monopoly on power. The Dear Leader and Marshal Kim Jong Un in a rare admission of a weakness states the same: “Frankly speaking, at our Party Plenary Meeting the country’s health and medical treatment sector’s current state of reality was thoroughly, scientifically, and honestly evaluated, and it pained my heart to criticize the fact that our country’s own capital does not wholly have modern medical treatment facilities,” an excerpt from a transcribed speech published in the Rodong Sinmun (5). Retrieved from Le Point, from © KCNA VIA KNS/AFP / STR Supreme Leader and The First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Marshal of the Republic, Ph.D, seen here birdwatching. Building a state of the art hospital in 7 months may seem insane, because it is. No doubt workers motivated by potential terms in a gulag will be able to finish it in time, but North Korea has a big shoddy construction problem. No one knows exactly, but recently hundreds died when an apartment block collapsed in Pyongyang. Remember: This is the capital, Pyongyang, where only the crème de la crème of Kim sycophants are allowed to enter. Wonder what it’s like elsewhere.
So, North Korea is cut off, starved, and no significant medical infrastructure to speak of. Naturally, (aside from shooting people) North Korea has been testing its people; a little over 30,000 people have been tested as of the start of the pandemic. Contrast this with South Korea’s envied 2,000,000- even accounting for the difference in population this is still a ratio of 33:1 roughly speaking. According to UN Special Rapporteur for North Korea Tomas Quintana, “The whole operation of the international community inside North Korea has been completely blocked," So we don’t have any reputable sources of enquiry, nor can we trust their message of ‘zero cases’. But wait: Maybe Un A has an explanation for this apparent miracle. And surprise surprise she does: Un A tells all in her video where she points to three main reasons why North Korea has been able to propitiously avoid ANY COVID-19 cases.
Thanks for reading my article, but it seems like everything I wrote is just fake news. Sorry for wasting your time folks shoulda remembered that Kim Jong Un would have prognosticate the Pandemic. (1) These badges are required for every loyal North Korean citizen, but unobtainable to ‘undesirables’ and sold at the jangmadang (장마당) or black market. (2) It was about North Koreans eating Pizza- akin to a bunch of aliens saying I too, fellow homo sapiens like democracy and freedom) (3) This is not actually factually correct, and this is true: it’s a joke. (4) “An estimated 59.2 percent of North Korea’s population is food-insecure in 2020, rising slightly to 59.8 percent when the effects of the COVID-19 macro shock are taken into account.” (5) Rodong Sinmun: The official State Newspaper in the DPRK (6) May be an understatement, if by ‘suggestion’ Un A is referring to 7.62 calibre bullets then yes, it is a ‘suggestion’. "North Korea - China friendship" by Roman Harak. Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0). Retrieved from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/5578914865/ BY: MOHIT MANNThe current Coronavirus outbreak in China is affecting people not only within but also beyond the borders of China. The issue’s impact is especially acute for North Korea, whereby the lockdown in China resulting from this outbreak complicates North Korean refugee journeys. A vast transportation lockdown, which is meant to contain the spread of this new virus, is responsible for exacerbating the already laborious journey of North Korean refugees. Chinese authorities have imposed an unprecedented lockdown to contain the viral outbreak, which has infected over 24,000 people and has claimed the lives of over 500 people worldwide. Public transportation links have been shut down, access has been restricted to major highways, and strict ID and temperature checks have been imposed. These actions have effectively placed tens of millions under quarantine. While the lockdown disrupts the daily lives of millions of people within China’s bounds, it is also simultaneously responsible for disrupting the main path through which North Koreans make their great escape. The route traditionally taken by North Korean defectors has been blocked due to obstacles such as road closures. As a result, these refugees are forced to indefinitely pause their journeys. They also face the threat of certain punishment if they are sent back home. China is a crucial link in the dangerous journey that North Koreans take in their endeavour to escape the draconian policies and measures of the tyrannical North Korean regime. These refugees make their way down through China and then find their way into Southeast Asian countries, such as Laos and Thailand, before they finally end up in South Korea. This journey can take months or longer to complete and is thousands of kilometers long. It also involves trekking over mountains by foot and using tiny boats to get across rivers. The part of the trip which pertains to China is especially risky, since North Korean refugees are forced to use fake ID cards. With China trying to control everyone’s movements, this trip has become even more dangerous. Tens of thousands of North Koreans are at various stages of their respective journeys through China. Some of them have decided to settle there illegally. However, as the lockdown expands to include house inspections, North Korean refugees may be in danger. North Korea’s most important international backer, China, refuses to grant these defectors refugee status and instead returns them to North Korea, where they could very likely be subject to torture or long prison sentences. An increased restriction of movement has additionally been felt inside North Korea itself as a result of the North Korea’s enhancement of restrictions to block the spread of the Coronavirus to its own territory. Staff of foreign embassies and international organizations in Pyongyang face increasing isolation from contact with North Koreans over fears of the spread of the virus. Moreover, North Korea has apparently temporarily stopped demanding that China repatriate defectors, since North Korea fears that these defectors may bring the deadly virus into North Korea. Thus, it is ultimately unclear what would happen to North Korean refugees who are discovered by Chinese authorities during their increasingly invasive inspections. Yet, there is room for optimism. People in this line of work are quite creative and have the potential to find backup routes –as they have done so before. North Korean defectors’ movements may be increasingly restricted as a result of the lockdown. But the North Korean regime has also stopped demanding repatriation of these defectors. Thus, while one avenue closes for the North Korean defectors, another avenue opens. What remains to be seen is how these defectors continue making their journeys and what type of help they will require as their respective journeys become especially dangerous and tricky. Source 1Source 23rd & 14th Field Hospital and PW Enclosure #10, Pusan, Korea. Announcement being made from a truck. SourceBy Neo Paul Korea has been known historically by two names in the West, The Land of the Morning Calm (a reading of its name in Chinese characters, 朝鮮 or Joseon) and the Hermit Kingdom, due to its reclusive nature up until the colonisation of Korea by Japan in the early 20th century. The epithet of the Hermit Kingdom has now been used to describe the Korean country on the northern half of the Peninsula, commonly known as North Korea (officially The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). To borrow from Voltaire, North Korea is neither Democratic, nor a Republic, nor of or for the People of North Korea. North Korea has been described a rogue nation, an international pariah, or more poignantly by former US President George W. Bush as a member of the “Axis of Evil”. While these claims hold some truths, it is far more constructive to analyse the behaviour of the North Korean state through a Stalinist/Communist lens than simply writing off North Korea as a nation ruled by a “pygmy” and a maniac (these terms have been applied to the ruling Kim dynasty-currently headed by Kim Jong Un). The purpose of this blogblurb is twofold, one to explain a brief history of the North Korean state and two, to explain the seemingly outrageous actions of North Korea on the world stage in a rational light, if possible. “Rocket man” must have his reasons for pursuing a dangerous game of nuclear chess after all. Flash backwards to the end of the Korean War (1950-1953) - 10% of civilians dead - North Korea was in ruins. Its cities had been flattened by US carpet bombing. The once industrious heartland of the Japanese colonial empire outside its home islands lay in ruins - but the Communists quickly remedied this. By 1956 North Korea had been rebuilt, and up till the 1970’s the CIA was dazzled by double digit growths - even outstripping its Southern-soon-to-be K-pop brother, South Korea in all areas of economic production (with one important caveat being agriculture). This impressive growth can be explained through the benefits of being a member of the Communist bloc coupled with authoritarian leadership. The then Soviet Union had loaned (given) Kim’s government 2 Billion rubles, and a veritable army of technocrats to aid in development. Meanwhile, the PRC (China) had effectively given Pyongyang the labour of the remnants of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) in North Korea for use as construction workers. This, plus a strong, centralised state with the support of the people (initially) allowed it to surpass its politically chaotic and divided southern nation (ROK). The Communists of the time were able to achieve such high rates of growth through mainly extensive development, or the effective mobilization of its resources, workers and whatnot. By the 1980’s however this growth had stalled. Grandiloquent projects, like spending (wasting) 4.5 Billion on athletic events, statues to the Great Leader etc., and the drop in Soviet aid after Korea had taken Peking’s side in their rift of the 50’s - as well as the neglect of intensive development (development focused on efficiency-new tech, etc.) all meant the economy was pretty sick. The final nails in the proverbial coffin of what is now the ruined North Korean Economy was the collapse of the soviet union and with it, its trading partners. The largest question here is - why did the famine of the 1990’s happen? Here we turn to the Stalinist interpretation of the regime. North Korea, like many Eastern Bloc states, fetishised heavy industry above all else - for how could true socialism be achieved in a non-industrialised country? After Marx himself said a Communist Revolution could only happen in an advanced country, not a provincial backwater like Korea or Bulgaria. Therefore the North Koreans sunk millions of dollars into developing glass factories, steelworks and so forth and neglected consumer goods and agriculture akin to the Warsaw Pact states. We can see similarities in China’s Great Leap Forward and in Eastern Europe, where Hungary turned into a primarily grain exporting country to a grain importing country by the end of the 50’s. North Korea already had a limited agricultural base, for only 20% of its land is arable and the South had always been more agriculturally productive. So, North Korea was the most advanced poor country in the world, so to speak. This focus on heavy industry was justified not only by Marxist dogma, but also by Juche, a philosophy of Autarchy promulgated by Kim Il Sung in 1956. A large Industrial base was the sine qua non of a powerful military, particularly to counter the US 8th army in South Korea. Factories were needed for production of missiles etc. In this North Korea was successful, for food can always be freely given but Missiles? Not so much. A disproportionate percentage of the GDP was thus diverted for military purposes. All this is of course in conjunction with a cult of personality around the Kim dynasty (after three consecutive Kim’s it would be fair to call it a monarchy, not a People’s Republic), a murderous secret police with an elaborate concentration camp system, and to top things off, a state of constant warfare against the US and South Korea (in parallel with the Eastern Bloc’s constant paranoia of “counter revolutionaries” and Fascists - or university students who were anti Rakosi - but I digress). All this coupled on dependence to Moscow and Beijing were a recipe for disaster when the drought and floods appeared. The effects of these catastrophes are still evident to this day, most strikingly illustrated in the fact that the average height for a North Korean male is 3-8 centimetres shorter than that of a South Korean male. All this being said, with North Korea exhibiting many similarities to a Stalinist Eastern European state or Maoist China, there are some striking differences. One has to merely look to the survival of a hard core Stalinist North Korea post 1991. North Korea was never truly a vassal state on Moscow or Beijing, and was never fully integrated into either bloc. In this sense North Korea exhibits more similarities to the Iran of the Ayatollah than to Communist China. When China moved away from a command economy in the 1970’s and when the USSR collapsed in 1991, North Korea remained obdurately on its course - even after a catastrophic famine, we can see how durable the regime really is. And though millions left for China and South Korea, the resistance of the regime is remarkable. Its allegiance to Juche meant that it could never fully integrate itself into the global economy, which resulted in famine, but its self-reliance and hermetic nature meant it could weather such things as famine and the collapse of Communism in Europe. And that is one of the reasons why North Korea adamantly refuses to give up on nuclearisation, for nuclear weapons are essential to the regime’s survival. It is the only card North Korea possesses, and a reason why such a poor and economically insignificant country wields such international clout. In any case it is my hope that a better understanding of their doctrine will enable us to combat this rogue nation in the future for the benefit of its people. Source 1: Robinson, Michael Edson. Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey: Honolulu, Hawai'i: Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 2008.Source 2Source 3Source 4BY: MOHIT MANN South Korea/North Korea Border. Source. Governments and international bodies from all corners of the world have pursued economic and financial sanctions against North Korea in efforts to punish the totalitarian regime for its many draconian policies, including grave human rights violations. While these measures present obstacles to the North Korean economy, their fundamental objectives remain largely unfulfilled. The effectuality of such measures is a matter that deserves the undivided attention of proponents of human rights since the North Korean government continues to severely restrict the scope of human rights within its jurisdiction, despite the heavy toll that has been exacted on its economy.
Experts argue that the success of international sanctions against North Korea has been largely undermined by “the failure of some countries to enforce them and the willingness of some companies to flout them”. Thus, the primary question for human rights advocates with respect to the effectuality of these measures is whether they would achieve the desired outcome of shifting North Korea’s stance on human rights if they were to be intensified. International sanctions seem to largely target North Korea’s nuclear pursuits, whereby attention to human rights violations is subordinated. For example, the United States has partially lifted its sanctions on the North Korean government on various occasions in exchange for a promise to halt its nuclear program and dismantle parts of its facilities. Yet, North Korea has reneged on its promises time and again. In addition to the subordination of human rights issues to concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, North Korea continues to receive support from states that have a similar human rights record to its own. The predominant supporters of North Korea in this matter are Russia and China, both of which lack a substantial human rights regime to say the least. For example, U.N. diplomats believe Russia and China falsely promote the idea that sanctions are in fact the cause for North Korea’s humanitarian problems in order to argue that North Korea should be provided sanctions relief. Moreover, North Korea recently expressed its desire to cut international aid staff that the United Nations deploys in the country due to the belief that the United Nations’ programs have failed “due to the politicization of U.N. assistance by hostile forces”. The aforementioned efforts of sanctions evasion thus present the biggest challenge associated with sanctions: enforcement. Enforcement is the responsibility of individual states, yet national authorities often have inefficient resources to inspect shipments and some individuals and entities continue to do business with North Korea outside the purview of the law. To make the problem worse, United Nations sanctions are especially prone to being ‘watered down’ in order to secure the backing of Russia and China due to their veto power in the U.N. Security Council. Both Russia and China are committed to precluding any type of regime change in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, many experts argue that before any new sanctions are considered, existing sanctions need to be better enforced. The North Korean government is responsible for committing some of the worst atrocities against its own people. Sanctions have not proven to be particularly useful tools for dispelling human rights violations in North Korea. However, they can have an altogether different effect if they are better enforced. States that impose sanctions against North Korea must look beyond the veil of its nuclear program and into its domestic realm in order to ensure that human rights violations are genuinely accounted for, in addition to their other major concerns. North Korea’s supporters also represent a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of sanctions; therefore, stronger international efforts are required to refute their positions. It is unequivocal that stronger enforcement mechanisms and measures are indeed required for this pursuit. Source 1, Source 2, Source 3. Although much of the media surrounding North Korea is focused on Kim Jong-Un, there is a dire need to recognize the appalling conditions that ordinary North Koreans face. Indeed, days before the summit between Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump in Vietnam, news surfaced that North Korea was facing a food shortage. For North Koreans, this food shortage represents a considerable issue, reminiscent of an extended famine called the ‘Arduous March’ that took place in the 1990s. Earlier this year, just before the summit in Vietnam, the North Korean government released a memo stating that North Korea was short 1.4 million tons of food in regards to their main crops of rice, wheat, potatoes, and soybeans. In 2018, the food production was 4.95 million tons, which was down 503 000 tons from 2017. Although the government has noted that they will import 200 000 tons and produce around 400 000 tons, the decreased production of food means that daily rations are cut from 500 grams to 300 grams. The UN World Food Programme notes that already 11 million people in the country of 25 million are undernourished, which is equal to about 40% of the population. Additionally, one in five children are stunted, which means that they are at a low height for their age. The World Food Programme explains that even minor disasters can have a significant effect on the production of food; indeed, in 2018, a heat wave in provinces crucial for agricultural production and a typhoon were important factors in the food shortage. The current situation in North Korea is reminiscent of a famine that struck North Korea in the 1990s. Called the ‘Arduous March’, and lasting from the mid-to-late 90s, it is estimated that up to a million people died by the end of the famine. Similarly to the current state in North Korea, natural disasters were an important factor in the famine. For a period of two years starting in 1995, North Korea was struck by floods and above average temperatures with low amounts of rainfall. These fluctuations caused shortages in the amount of food available, and although the international community and NGOs provided aid and food, it was discovered that the North Korean government had thwarted the supplies from civilians. This discovery led to the withdrawal of many NGOs from North Korea. Factors like political corruption meant that civilians without any political connections, who could only access food through the public distribution system, were the most affected. Mina Yoon, whose childhood overlapped with the ‘Arduous March’, describes how malnutrition is so common in North Korea that it is not considered a problem as long as one is able to walk. Yoon explains that as her younger sister suffered from critical malnutrition, even losing her eyesight at one point, Yoon herself never felt that she was in bad health. The current food shortage poses a serious risk to North Koreans, as proven through the consequences of the ‘Arduous March’. Food shortages, through a variety of natural and political reasons, most heavily affect civilians. Therefore, the famine - which resulted in the loss of one millions lives - should not be repeated, and conditions like malnutrition should not be a norm. However, this situation is the reality of 40% of North Koreans, and it is the reality that so many try to flee. Source 1, Source 2, Source 3, Source 4, Source 5, Source 6, Source 7 Movements such as the #MeToo movement have shed light on cases of sexual harassment and sexual assault, and have provided a platform for countless victims to describe their experiences. However, a report by the Human Rights Watch describes the sexual violence that women in North Korea endure, often without any support and recognition. The report describes sexual violence against women in places such as prisons, detention centres, and markets, and the lack of assistance and acknowledgement from the North Korean government or society.
Women in North Korea face sexual violence from men in positions of power, especially in prisons and detention centres. Interviewees reported cases of rape, committed by using physical force against them and/or by taking advantage of their vulnerability. One woman, Yoon So Ryun, says she was raped when she was called in for questioning, but did not report the rape because she thought staying quiet would be best for her and her family. There is a sense of fear among women about reporting incidents of rape or other forms of sexual violence. Kim Eun A, who escaped North Korea in 2015, had previously attempted to flee but was caught. She describes how both the police investigator in charge of her case and her defence lawyer touched her in different places such as her breast. Despite feeling uncomfortable, she says she did not say anything because government officials had normalized this kind of behaviour. Although women make up the majority of traders in markets, women may face consequences for refusing sexual advances from male officials who manage the markets. Women are thoroughly aware that turning down sexual advances could lead to punishment or a loss of goods or money: Kim Chul Kook, who used to work as a trader along with his wife, said that accepting sexual coercion of women by male market officials was the only way to survive. These accounts given by interviewees imply the extreme degree of sexual violence North Korean women face in their lives. Despite the pervasiveness of sexual violence in North Korea, most women do not report any instances of sexual violence because of a lack of support from the government as well as the heavy social stigma surrounding it. Indeed, many women in the Human Rights Watch report describe seeing or hearing about other women, who were raped or experienced sexual violence, face backlash if word spread about what had happened to them. Many interviewees said they were scared of this backlash, and women in detention centres and prisons said they had seen victims being harassed by officials. On paper, North Korea says that it is committed to gender equality, but the reality is very different. In schools, there is a lack of sex education and stereotypical gender roles are enforced – with boys often encouraged to be leaders over their female students. For victims of sexual violence, there is a lack of medical and social support – the latter of which is also stigmatized. The sexual violence against women in prisons, detention centres, and markets only offers a small snippet of the serious problems that North Korean women face, most of which continue to persist because of a lack of support from the government and society in general. The accounts from the Human Rights Watch report interviewees prove that sexual violence against women is widespread, and victim blaming combined with an insufficient amount of support from the government perpetuates a cycle of sexual violence against women. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, it is even more significant to note that there are still many living without the ability to voice their experiences with sexual violence. Source On October 24th, McGill Students of HanVoice had the distinct privilege of joining 5 other HanVoice chapters from across Canada in a lobbying event on Parliament Hill. “HanVoice on the Hill” presented a unique opportunity for everyday students to speak with the nation’s key leaders and decision-makers about the issues regarding North Korean human rights and refugees. Moreover, this was a chance for our group to spur meaningful political change in order to provide tangible benefits for North Korean refugees.
Due to China’s unwillingness to recognize North Korean defectors as “legitimate refugees”, these individuals are forced to make the arduous trek down to intermediary sanctuary countries like Thailand to make their refugee claims. Currently, only South Korea and the United States are accepting these North Koreans for resettlement but this process has become exceedingly difficult under the current Trump administration. Our purpose of going to Ottawa was to demonstrate that Canada could be a viable third option for these individuals. Minister Ahmed Hussen of the IRCC currently has the discretionary power under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to allow Canada to accept these refugees, and it was our mission to show that Canadians want to help. With the gracious help of Senator Yonah Martin’s office, our group was able to meet with over 40 parliamentarians and policy makers to impart this message. This included MP Ruby Sahota, the NDP’s critic for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship MP Jenny Kwan, and Deputy Chair of the Standing Committee on Human Rights Senator Salma Ataullahjan. Fortunately, we were greeted with overwhelming support as most of the parliamentarians pledged to either write a letter to the minister, bring up the topic during question period, or speak personally with him about the issue. Furthermore, we had the opportunity to hear from distinguished speakers such as the Korean Ambassador to Canada Shin Maeng-ho, the Japanese Ambassador to Canada Kimihiro Ishikane, and the former Canadian Ambassador to Vietnam Marius Grinius who helped further contextualize the North Korean issue and explored the topic from a foreign policy standpoint. We finally concluded our three days in Parliament Hill on October 26th. In the following weeks, we had a chance to reflect on the life-changing experiences we had gained in such a short amount of time. Not only did we return to our chapters equipped with greater confidence and more effective leadership and advocacy skills, we also came back with an immense pride for our achievements. Speaking to parliamentarians of different political stripes was at first a daunting task. Many of us were nervous at the thought of making potentially critical mistakes in front of experienced politicians. Yet, ultimately many of them expressed their support for our cause and the resettlement project. Although this is just a step towards realizing our goal of making North Korean resettlement in Canada a possibility, realizing that our collective voice can make a tangible difference in the lives of North Korean refugees was extremely empowering. I travelled to North Korea in 2012 and spent 10 days within the hermit kingdom. I travelled to the country with a delegation from First Steps Canada, a small organization run out of a basement in Kitsilano, Vancouver, which donates soybeans to orphanages in North Korea. First Steps Canada sends Canadian soybeans to North Korea to be processed into nutrient-rich soymilk, which orphans are given a few servings of each day. The amazing work done by people at First Steps provides over a hundred thousand North Korean orphans with life-sustaining soymilk each and every day.
Of course, it is one thing to raise money, purchase soybeans and ship them to North Korea. It is an entirely different thing to ensure that these beans arrive at the orphanages where they are most needed, without being skimmed off by the port authority, the military, or other organs of the North Korean state apparatus. After all, in a country where millions of people are starving and food aid is scarce (more on this later), it is sad yet unsurprising that resources may be diverted away from helpless children. Because of this, representatives from First Steps must travel to North Korea five or six times a year, to take inventory of the landed shipments, to speak to the orphanage caretakers, and to ensure that the soybeans are being given to those who they are intended to be given to – the children. Towards the end of our time in North Korea, I found myself in Nampo, a harbour city on the west coast of the peninsula. Travelling with First Steps, we had NGO status and were thus able to leave the illusionary grandeur of Pyongyang to see what few foreigners get to see – the real North Korea. Nampo was a town like many others outside Pyongyang. Buildings were decrepit and dimly lit due to the apparent lack of electricity, and we saw few people on the street. Our guides (assigned to us by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, perhaps ‘handlers’ is a better term) took us to a ‘store,’ which had next to nothing on the shelves. Our first meeting with a municipal official. He discussed the process of receiving the soybeans at the port, transporting them to foodstuffs depots, and finally distributing them to local schools and charities. What was memorable about this meeting was that one member of our delegation, from the World Food Organization, suggested that the city of Nampo accept imports of genetically modified food (GMO) to help feed the population. He explained that while naturally occurring soybeans contained only 3 beans per pod, GMO soybeans contained a minimum of 5, often 6 per pod. Without significantly increasing the post of import or transport, they could double their soybean supply. To this, the official responded with a resounding ‘No!’ Although I couldn’t understand his Korean, I was later told that the official had ranted about how GMO crops were a ploy of the west, and that North Korea and the city of Nampo would never accept donations of them. North Korea is a country which receives relatively little food aid already, yet they were refusing increased shipment of soybeans. This man was willing to weigh his ideology above the nourishment of his own people. Unfortunately, this was not dissimilar to the attitudes of many of the people I met during my time in North Korea. Almost blind adherence to ideology often meant that people suffered greatly. Our next appointment that day was at a foodstuffs distribution centre. In the meeting, they talked the usual game of praising the successful policies of regime and the resultant abundance of food, while simultaneously insisting that the soybean shipments from Canada must be increased. As was common in many meetings we attended, a table full of food was laid out for us, as a way to try to impress us. It was ironic that in a meeting about food insecurity and aid, they laid out a bounty of food for us to see. It was certainly a feast by North Korean standards, and I was saddened that regular people - ones who truly needed it - would not be receiving the food In the adjoining warehouse, it was time to take an inventory of the soybean shipments. I hopped up onto the stacks of 50lb soybean bags and started counting. In that moment, I was truly what you could call a ‘bean counter’. Of course, the bags were stacked 10 feet high and there were hundreds of them, so I had to estimate. I walked around and meticulously counted, checking and rechecking the numbers. But even according to my highest estimates, there were no more than 2/3rds of the beans that they were claiming there were, present. That meant there were literally tons of donated soybeans that were unaccounted for. We confronted the North Korean officials about the missing beans. A royal shouting match ensued, with the North Koreans accusing us of lying and dishonesty and just about everything in the book. The maybe-mayor of Nampo who had gotten upset over GMO’s had rejoined us, and he too got involved. The officials told us to leave Nampo. They threatened us by saying that First Steps was no longer permitted to operate in their city. Our appointments for the rest of the day were cancelled. Later, we were informed by the North Koreans that the shipments had in fact been diverted to a different centre, in Pyongyang. “Great! Since we’ve been kicked out of Nampo, we’re going to head back to Pyongyang now and we can check on the shipment”. To that, the officials responded by scrambling about frantically, realizing that we had called their bluff. The ride back to Pyongyang was sullen that evening. If the officials truly had banned First Steps from operating in Nampo, then thousands of orphans would stop receiving their daily soymilk meals. Because the pride and integrity of those officials had been challenged, they were willing to stop shipments of foreign aid to their most vulnerable citizens. We arrived in the outskirts of Pyongyang at dusk, at the orphanage where it was claimed that the beans had been sent. It was immediately apparent that the beans had not been sent to this orphanage long earlier, as had been suggested. We knew this because when we arrived, about 20 workers were hastily unloading a shipment of First Steps soybeans from a truck. They had evidently sent a shipment to this orphanage last minute, likely to cover their bluff in Nampo. Whether or not they were the same beans that were diverted away from the warehouse in Nampo, we do not know. We were resigned, we had been lied to, and were being deceived. But at least this orphanage in Pyongyang would now receive a shipment of soybeans, so it was a victory in that sense. We did not want to confront the Nampo Officials once more, for fear of being kicked out of the city and for the sake of the orphans who live there. Sending humanitarian aid shipments to the DPRK is a tricky matter. It is important to ensure that the aid is being received by those who need it the most. However, as demonstrated above, by confronting these officials in Nampo about the skimming-off of the soybean shipments, First Steps almost had its operations in Nampo ended. To send aid to orphanages requires an extent of cooperation with the regime to ensure that they will allow First Steps to continue to operate in the country. However, sending aid into North Korea without any checks or balances will all but ensure that the aid ends up in the hands of the regime, and not in the hands of the children. It is upon this fine balance that humanitarian agencies operating in North Korea must operate. [In the end, the officials at the city of Nampo realized how dependent they were on First Steps’ shipments and agreed to allow them to continue to send shipments of soybeans to orphanages in the country.] |